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Introduction
When entrepreneurs must make costs ex ante, i.e. write a business proposal, buy a patent etc. and the returns to their investment depend on the willingness of banks to provide credit, which on turn depends on the willingness of investors to buy risky assets, the economy can get stuck in an ine¢ cient equilibrium.
The fact that the total stock market losses are many times larger than the estimated 2.2 trillion potential deterioration in U.S.-originated credit assets held by banks and others is consistent with the view that there are multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria of the Diamond (1982) type.
In August 2007, the …rst signs came that housing market was overvalued in the US. Before this period, monetary policy in the US focussed on providing more liquidity and keeping interest rates low rather than at the quality and transparency of the bank's balance sheets. The low interest rates and the salary schemes in the banking sector stimulated the development of risky assets like the complex mortgage-backed securities.
The interconnection of the banking system made the system more robust against small shocks but less robust to the risks of "tail" events, see Acemoglu (2009) and Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries (2004) . Since the house-price-and-related-asset bubble has bursted, there has been a ‡ight to quality in the …nancial sector.
Lucas (2008) describes this as: "Everyone wants to get into government-issued and government-insured assets, for reasons of both liquidity and safety". Caballero and Kurlat (2008) argue that while the US as a whole is regarded to be save (and this still leads to net capital in ‡ows), all other forms of funding dried up.
Similar arguments hold for savers, see Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Flight to quality is not speci…c for the current crisis but has been reported to take place in many cyclical downturns. 1 Rogo¤ (2008, 2009) give evidence that the current crisis shows a lot of similarities with past crises around the entire world.
In the model, I study the e¤ect of this ‡ight to quality on investment behavior and credit supply. I
show that for certain con…gurations, ‡ight-to quality can destroy an e¢ cient trade equilibrium and that in that case, government intervention is required to prevent the economy from getting stuck in an ine¢ cient no-trade equilibrium. I also show that because of macro-economic complementarities the social returns to investing in risky assets exceeds the private returns.
Besides Diamond (1982) the model is related to Silviera and Wright (2006) who consider a search model where entrepreneurs search for venture capital. In their model there is a more active role for the capital supplier in judging projects but they do not consider the coordination frictions which I focus on in this paper. Cooper and John (1988) give a nice overview of other sources of coordinations failures and sources of multiple equilibria in models with macroeconomic complementarities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and gives a numerical example and section 3 discusses some of the recent policy proposals in the light of this model. 1 See e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993).
The model
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how after a ‡ight-to quality in the …nancial sector, the economy can get stuck in an ine¢ cient equilibrium and that there is potential scope for government intervention. For this goal I choose to write down an extremely stripped down model where I leave many factors out that are important to understand the current crisis, like asymmetric information, deregulation, heterogeneity in projects etc. thereby sacri…cing realism for simplicity. This enables me to isolate the e¤ects of coordination frictions. The idea is that banks need su¢ cient capital before they can lend to the …rms. This simpli…cation allows me to ignore the distribution of assets over banks. The total number of contacts between banks and …rms is LB per unit of time where L is the total number of …rms with projects and B is the number of banks with funds (i.e. which sold a risky asset). Agents discount the future at rate r. N; S; ; ; ; c; r; u; z 0 and z are all exogenous (although for the investors, there is a participation constraint that expected payo¤s must be non-negative). 2 Finally, I only consider symmetric strategies and focus on the steady state where B; L are constant over time.
Assumptions

Characterization
Let V N P and V P be the values for …rms of being in states N P (having no project and looking for one) and P (having a project and looking for a bank to …nance it). Then,
At rate the …rms …nd projects. When they …nd one, they gain the di¤erence in value of state P and N P , and pay a cost c if they believe the project to be pro…table. If they expect the investment to not be pro…table, they do not invest and receive 0. The value for a …rm of having an implementable project is,
At rate B an individual …rm meets a bank with su¢ cient funds. In that case, the …rm receives u and switches to state N P:
Denote the value of a bank without funds by V N F and with funds by V F : Then,
Banks meet investors who are willing to buy risky assets at rate S and switch from state N F to state F if this occurs. Since banks cannot do anything else with z 0 than …nance investments, there is no direct value of owning z 0 : The value of having funds for a bank is,
Banks with funds meet …rms at rate L and they receive u if this occurs. The asset value for an investor who wants to buy a risky asset is:
At rate (N B) she meets a bank without funds, switches to state R and buys the risky asset for z 0 from the bank. When she owes a risky asset the ‡ow value of her state is:
At rate L her bank meets a …rm with a project and it receives z and switches to state N R.
There are two steady state conditions; one for the banks, and one for the …rms. First, for the banks,
2 We can think of the size of agents who own or want to own a risky asset as M where S agents are looking for a bank to buy the risky asset from and M S agents own a risky asset. All relations below hold for any value of M , S.
where I 1 is an indicator variable which has value 1 if it is pro…table for the investors to exchange a risky asset for cash with the bank and 0 otherwise. The in ‡ow of banks with resources is equal to the number of banks without resources that meet and sell a risky asset in exchange for capital: ( S (N B) ). The out ‡ow of banks with capital is equal to the number of contacts between banks and …rms with projects ( LB). The steady state condition for …rms is,
where I 2 is an indicator variable which has value 1 if …rms who receive an idea/project pay the cost c and start to look for a bank and 0 otherwise. So the in ‡ow of …rms with feasible projects is the number of …rms who receive a project and pay the setup cost ( (1 L) I 2 ) and the out ‡ow is equal to the number of …rms with projects who meet a bank with su¢ cient funds ( BL).
Finally, for each value of S, (7) holds. The number of owners of risky assets increase when an investor buys a risky asset from the bank which occurs at rate ( S (N B) I 1 ) while each time a bank meets a …rm, one holder of a risky asset receives her payo¤, looses her risky asset and starts to look for a new one. This happens at rate BL. If the number of agents who either owns or who is willing to buy a risky asset is M then we have (M S) owners of risky assets and S investors looking for a risky asset if the participation constraint from Proposition 2 is ful…lled. Since (7) must hold for any value of S, M is irrelevant.
Depending on parameter values there are at most two equilibria. investors buy risky assets, …rms work out their plans and banks …nance the investment projects.
Proof. See the appendix
These conditions follow from V P V N P > c,and V N R > 0:
The equilibrium can be characterized as follows. First, we get from (8),
Substituting this in (7) gives:
which has one positive root for B.
For (9) and (10) to be an equilibrium, we must check whether the conditions in Proposition 2 are ful…lled.
Welfare
Steady state welfare is given by the weighted value of all states (where the weights are determined by the number of investors in each state).
Obviously, the no trade equilibrium with B = L = S = 0 generates lower welfare than the trade equilibrium.
If S would be determined by free entry there would be too little entry because of the quadratic contact technology and the fact that part of the returns to the investments go to the banks and …rms.
A simple numerical example
This section illustrates that (i) for certain con…gurations, a ‡ight to quality eliminates the e¢ cient trade equilibrium, and (ii) that even if the trade equilibrium is not eliminated, social welfare increases more than the total expected payo¤s that …rms of risky assets receive when S goes from 0:5 to 1 (keeping M S constant and equal to 1). Details are in Appendix 3. A less dark scenario is that u > 1:27c and z > 1:18z 0 , suppose u = z = 2 and c = z 0 = 1. Then, the ‡ight to quality does not eliminate the trade equilibrium (although it could still push the economy in the no-trade equilibrium). However, in that case, the total increase in welfare when S would go back to 1 exceeds the total payo¤s that go to the …rms of the risky assets. r This is due to the macroeconomic complementarities, see Cooper and John (1988) .
In this very simple setting there are only two equilibria but it is easy to imagine that if …rms are heterogeneous in terms of the pro…tability of their projects or if the investors who buy the risky asset pay a …xed entry cost (i.e. the cost of studying the pro…tability of projects) there can be more than two Pareto rankable equilibria. I also assumed that the investors bear all the risks but the model can be adjusted such that the banks bear some risks, i.e. must pay back z 0 after some time irrespective of whether they found a …rm with a business plan or not. Banks will then only invest if they expect that there are enough …rms with projects and similarly, …rms are only willing to develop their projects if they expect that there are enough banks with funds. Finally, it is straightforward to make the risky asset more risky by letting some projects fail at rate :
Discussion
During the credit crisis, banks engaged in deleveraging, which made it more di¢ cult for …rms to …nd banks that were willing to supply loans which as an extreme case can be thought of as a reduction in (it becomes harder to …nd a bank with su¢ cient capital): As mentioned before, the ‡ight to quality can be interpreted as a reduction in S. Because of the macro-economic complementarities, the ‡ight to quality a¤ected the beliefs of the …rms which a¤ected the beliefs of the banks and vice versa. In normal times, the FED would buy treasury bills in the federal-funds market to reduce the Federal funds rate but when this rate is essentially zero, the di¤erence between treasury bills and cash vanishes. Lucas (2008) argues that the FED could still satisfy the demand for quality by using reserves to buy other securities. In terms of the model above, if the FED buys securities, it increases B: Without enough risk free securities, the desire to hold quality securities just reduces the prices of other assets.
Is this is enough? Cochrane (2009) argues that sooner or later, …rms and banks will realize that the 2% returns to treasury bills is less attractive than the 9% returns for corporate bonds. This makes sense if there is a unique market equilibrium and if we are temporarily in a disequilibrium However, in the presence of coordination frictions, getting out of a low activity equilibrium requires a lot of coordination.
Caballero and Kurlat (2008) argue that in order to stop the extreme risk aversion, the government should purchase some of the bank's securities by an auction. This will signal to …rms who play a waiting strategy (for prices to fall further) that prices will stop falling and eliminate the gains from speculative waiting.
Finally, in the model, the social value of investing in risky assets is larger than the private value because of macroeconomic complementarities. This suggests that we should, as Alesina and Zingales (2009) argue, subsidize risk taking, for example by decreasing or eliminating the capital gain and dividend taxes.
or,
The participation constraint for the investors who buy risky assets is:
(6)- (5) gives
Plugging this in the participation constraint gives:
In the trade equilibrium, (2)-(1) yields:
substituting this back in (1) and (2)- (5) yields:
Similarly (4)-(3) yields:
substituting this back in (3) and (4) gives,
Plugging (8) in (7) yields:
There is one positive solution for B:
B Numerical example (not to be included in the paper)
Since, the in ‡ow of investors does not depend on S (only on the number of contacts between banks with funds and …rms with projects), M S can take any value and I decide to set it equal to 1. So we can think of the ‡ight to quality either as a drop in M or a drop in S (as I do here). 
